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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the economic trade-offs associated with open-sourcing, the business strategy
of releasing the source code of a commercial software product. We model open-sourcing as a strategic
option for firms that compete in the market for software products. At the core of our model is the effect of
open-sourcing on customer values, as well as the relative ease of customizing the open-source products.
We show that open-sourcing can arise as an equilibrium outcome in our two-stage game. If the
enhancement of customer value from open-sourcing is moderate or high, in equilibrium firms may find it
optimal to release the source code of their commercial software products even when this strategy may
reduce their profits.
Keywords: Open Source Software, Game Theory, Open-sourcing, Competition

1

INTRODUCTION

We wish to investigate the observation, puzzling to many, that some firms in the current business
environment choose to open-source some of their software products. In what follows, we refer to the
release of a software product to the open-source community as open-sourcing. The observation that many
firms choose to open-source their products is at first sight puzzling because open-sourcing can hardly be
seen as consistent with profit maximization. Clearly, the commercial product and the open-source
counterpart are substitutes. It seems quite intuitive that by making a substitute product available free of
charge, any software producer would lower its profit from the sale of the commercial product. Thus, we are
quite uneasy about the tension that arises between this apparent reduction in profit and the observation
that an increasing number of software firms choose to open-source their commercial products.
An increasing number of firms release their products, free of charge. For instance, in October 2004, IBM
released Cloudscape, a relational database product, to the Apache Software Foundation, an active member
of the OSS community. It is interesting to note that consistent with what seems to be the norm for this type
of situation, IBM offers full customer support for the product that was released to the OSS community.
Similarly, in August 2004 Computer Associates released their database product Ingres to the OSS
community. Notably, in November of 2005, Computer Associates created a new company, Ingres Corp., to
provide support and services for their OSS database product.
Why would a firm that enjoys a sizable stream of profit from the sale and service of a product choose to
create its own competition by releasing a free open-source product? How does open-sourcing affect the
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competitive environment faced by software firms? And, importantly, is there an economic mechanism
through which open-sourcing can contribute to software firms enhancing their competitive position?
The following two quotes suggest some explanations. According to John Prial, IBM’s vice president of
marketing and information management software,
“By open sourcing Cloudscape, IBM hopes to accelerate development of Java-based applications and drive
more innovation around Linux and Java. [...] We think it will especially create new business opportunities
[...].”(Prial (2004))
Bertrand Serlet, senior vice president of software at Apple, argues that
“[With open-source code,] thousands of people look at the critical portions of source code and check those
portions are right. It’s a major advantage to have open-source code.”(Serlet, 2004)
An increased pace of innovations and improved security through increased exposure are, indeed, two of
the major candidate explanations for the recent pattern of open-sourcing. But are these sufficient reasons
to open-source a product? We argue that the answer is a qualified yes. Open-sourcing may result in
product innovation and quality. The literature mentions several other reasons for open-sourcing. An
important such reason is the use of open-source products by firms who wish to gain an advantage over
their competitors. Few of the explanations in the literature, however, discuss the impact of open-source
products on the customer’s perception of the commercial and open-source products. We argue in what
follows that the release of an open-source product affects the customer’s valuations. We show how this
change in customer valuations, in turn, is an important determinant of a firm’s open-sourcing strategy.
We intend to show by way of a simple model how open-sourcing can arise as an equilibrium strategy. Even
though our model is somewhat stylized, we are able to capture some of the principal economic trade-offs
involved in the software developer’s decision to release open-source products. We find that open-sourcing
can be profitable in some situations. Open-sourcing can arise as a result of competition, despite the
reduction in profit that is caused by “customer loss” – i.e., the reduction in market share that may arise as a
result of open-sourcing. We show that if the enhancement of customer value that results from opensourcing is moderate, firms may find it optimal to release open-source products. When the value gains to
the customers from open-sourcing are high, we show that firms cannot take full advantage of these gains.
The firm’s inability to funnel some of the customer value gains into higher profits is due to increased
competition. Overall, our results indicate that it is the customers, not the firms, who are likely to benefit
the most from open-sourcing.
Our paper has two important managerial implications. First, we show that open sourcing is more likely to
be an outcome of competition when firms anticipate that the presence of an open-source product
enhances customer values for the commercial product. This value enhancement may be primarily
attributable to new product features, to bug fixes and to improved security that result from open-sourcing.
Second, as intuition suggests, increased competition from the free open-source products of their
competitors erodes the profits of the firms that do not release open-source products.
The next section provides a review of the relevant literature. Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της
αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε. gives a brief outline of the market for open-source products. We develop our
model in Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε. and collect results in
Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.. Concluding remarks are in Section
Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.. The proofs and calculations are relegated to
an Appendix that is available by request.
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2

RELATED LITERATURE

Our work is related to the literature on OSS and to the literature on pricing of information goods. Schiff
(2002) provides a comprehensive survey of the early literature on OSS. The current research on OSS can be
classified into three broad categories (see von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006). Analysis of the motivations of
open source contributors is by far the most popular research topic, perhaps because it has at its core the
puzzling observation that cohorts of talented programmers choose to contribute to OSS projects with no
apparent compensation. Unlike the programmers of most commercial software projects, OSS project
contributors are volunteers located in various parts of the world. Topics concerning the governance,
organization and innovation processes associated with OSS constitute the second main stream of OSS
research (MacCormack et al., 2006; Koch and Schneider, 2002). The third stream of research is focused on
the competition between open source and traditional, closed-source software (Casadesus-Masanell and
Ghemawat, 2006; Economides and Katsamakas, 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Mustonen, 2005).
Our paper belongs to the third stream of OSS research. We seek to provide some economic explanations
for the increased incidence of firms that compete by releasing open-source counterparts of their
proprietary software products. Like our analysis, a few studies examine hybrid business models that include
proprietary and open source software (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Krishnamurthy, 2005). An important
motivation in Rossi and Bonaccorsi (2005) is that firms that open their code expect to obtain contributions
and feedback in order to fix bugs and improve the software. Other explanations for open-sourcing include,
as perhaps best articulated by IBM’s Jon Prial (2004), an increase in the rate of innovations and the
resulting increase in demand for a complementary commercial product of the same firm.
A few studies examine the competition between commercial software and OSS ( Casadesus-Masanell and
Ghemawat (2006), Economides and Katsamakas (2006)). These studies assume the existence of an OSS
product without specifically addressing the determinants of a firm’s decision to open source.
Hawkins (2004) makes an important point that the release of code may be profitable because it entails a
reduction in the cost of maintaining the code. In Mustonen (2005) the firm’s decision not to support the
rival software results in incompatibility between its commercial program and the freely available substitute.
The model is similar to ours in that it considers customers who are heterogeneous with respect to their
valuations of the competing products, but in his model only one firm acts strategically. A similar analysis by
Sen (2007) explores the competition between proprietary software, an OSS product and a commerciallysupported offering of the OSS product. August et al. (2007) consider a model in which a firm chooses
between open- and closed-source architectures. Profits are obtained from services such as integration,
support and consulting associated with the open source product.
Our work is also related to the literature on the pricing of information goods, in particular, to the work on
versioning of information goods (Bhargava and Choudhary, 2008; Weber, 2008; Jing, 2007; Ghose and
Sundararajan, 2005; Sundararajan, 2004; Dewan et al., 2003; Jing, 2003; Bhargava and Choudhary, 2001;
Raghunathan, 2000). While, like most models of versioning, our model views the open source product as a
differentiated version of the closed-source product, our model does not view open-sourcing as a tool for
price discrimination or as a cause of network effects.
The explanations given in the literature for the existence of open source software, while providing valuable
insight, go only some way toward identifying the reason why software firms choose to open-source their
products. In the academic literature and in the media, two stories seem to coalesce as the most likely
candidate explanations for open-sourcing. First, the release of open-source products increases market size,
so that firms benefit from the sale of complementary products or services. Second, the release of opensource products reduces the cost of maintaining and debugging the code. The logic of both arguments
relies on the fact that open-sourcing may be, from a dynamic perspective, profitable for a software firm.
Both explanations rely on the intuition that a favorable trade-off exists for the software firm between short
1119

run losses in revenue that stem from “customer loss” (i.e., the reduction of revenue that arises as a result
of making a substitute product available free of charge) and, in the long run, increased profitability that is
due to higher revenues or lower costs. We think that in this particular case intuition is misguided. If the
main consequence of open-sourcing is an increase in the number of customers who use the product,
market size could also be increased through free distribution of closed-source software. Free distribution
could also result in better testing and reporting of bugs. Furthermore, the reduction in the cost of
maintaining or debugging the source code achieved as a result of “more eyeballs” scanning the released
source code for bugs could be achieved through the release of the source code to a set of qualified firms or
individuals, and not to the community at large.
It is unlikely that the economic drivers of a firm’s decision to release open source products could be clearly
and easily enumerated. A firm’s open-sourcing decision is affected by a multitude of factors. Some of these
factors are identified in the literature. Our contribution is to bring to the fore an important, yet little
explored aspect of open-sourcing: the impact of open source releases on the customer’s valuation of the
product. In the next section we highlight some of the important characteristics of open-source products
and explore the ways in which these characteristics affect the customer’s perception of open- and closedsource products .

3

OSS MARKET AND PRODUCTS

Hardly any online user forum devoted to a particular software product lacks complaints from users
concerning the product features or, more often, the absence of desired features. In their out-of-the-box
state most software products fail to meet each minute requirement of their users. In general, closed-source
products cannot be viewed as highly customizable. By customization we mean changing the product to fit
the existing infrastructure and needs of a firm. Conversely, OSS products may be freely customized to meet
any user’s precise needs. OSS users may manipulate the source code, either to make minor modifications
or to go as far as to significantly change the product’s functionality to integrate it to the existing
information systems. While users of closed-source software products are generally restricted to making
only minor changes to the product, they may modify their processes or practices in order to use the
software more effectively. The time and effort spent incorporating desired functionality into OSS products
or adapting to the requirements of closed-source products is reflected in costs incurred by the user. We
believe that, for most products, the cost of customizing an open source product is lower than the cost of
adapting to the requirements and customizing, to the extent possible, its commercial counterpart.
Intimately related to open-sourcing is the issue of perception of OSS by the customer. Some customers may
have a hard time assessing whether an open-source product has the same performance as the original,
proprietary product (or a competing developer’s product). SugarCRM is a provider of commercial open
source customer relationship management software for companies with several deployment options to suit
customer’s security, integration and configuration needs. They offer two distinct products: Sugar Enterprise
and Sugar Community Edition. The community edition allowed users to view and change the source as long
as they follow the Sugar Public License (currently GPLv3). Unlike the community edition (which is free), the
enterprise edition can only be acquired for a fee. Users of the Sugar software could perceive other
significant differences between the enterprise and the community editions. The Community Edition lacks
the functionality required to create teams or to assign access levels to the teams (Farber, 2005). The
inability to keep users from deleting each other’s contacts, schedules, leads, etc. makes the community
edition relatively unfit for commercial use. The missing functionality is added in the Enterprise edition.
SugarCRM employs full-time developers and the new features incorporated into the commercial product
are generally missing from the free OSS product. Similar to the case of Sun’s office products, the SugarCRM
example indicates that the OSS counterpart of the proprietary software product is “crimped” in that it has
reduced functionality. The concept of crimping is not new. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) describe it in the
context of technology products. Our software case is similar in that the commercial developer incurs a cost
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to provide the (OSS ready) lower functionality product. However, the analogy breaks down when we
consider that savvy OSS users have the freedom to re-establish the “crimped” functionality by re-writing
the relevant code. The free availability of the source code allows the user to make changes to the product
at a cost that we believe is lower than the cost of changing the functionality of the proprietary product.

4

THE MODEL

We consider the incentives for open-sourcing in a duopoly. The strategies of the firms in our model include
a decision to open-source their output. Prior work by Sen (2007) and August et al. (2007) analyzed the
competition between an OSS alternative and a closed-source commercial alternative. These authors
showed that there may be benefits to open-sourcing when services are considered in conjunction with the
software product. However, these papers do not consider the firm’s incentives to open-source their
products in the absence of competition in the services market. In contrast, our model analyzes the
competition between closed- and open-source products as an outcome of the firm’s strategic decisions to
open source their products. Also, our model assumes that differentiation is embodied in the product itself
and not due to differences in documentation and support services. While often software and service are
not easy to disentangle, we gain some modeling flexibility by focusing only on the product market.
We model the variability of the fit of a software product to a firm’s existing systems and needs using
Hotelling’s (1938) spatial model of product differentiation. Similar analyses of competition in open source
environments abound; a recent example is the work of Gutsche (2005). As it is commonplace in the
literature on product differentiation, we assume that the two firms are located at the ends of a line
segment of unit length and share a measure of customers that we normalize to one without loss of
generality. We also assume that the customers are continuously (and uniformly) distributed over the unit
length segment and that a customer demands at most one product. We interpret the location of a
customer relative to a firm as that customer’s ideal product requirement. A customer who is closer to a
given firm incurs a smaller disutility to use the firm’s software than a customer who is farther away. As
such, we model customers as heterogeneous in their fit for the products of the two firms. We assume that
the two firms are symmetric in all relevant attributes, except location. To operationalize the notion of fit,
we assume that customers incur a specific unit fit cost ( ) to use a given software. Given the symmetry of
the firms, at equal prices, a customer prefers the firm that is closer. In this sense, customers located
relatively close to a firm are “captive” and thus each firm does enjoy some degree of market power. Similar
analyses in the literature have considered open source products as differentiated versions of their closed
source counterparts, see e.g. Blitzer (2004) and the references therein.

Figure 1. Market for a software product in duopoly.
Figure 1 provides a depiction of our main setup. Let x denote the distance of a customer from Firm 1 on the
unit line. The customer could purchase the output of either firm. We assume that customers purchase at
most one unit of output from either of the two firms. If the customer buys the closed-source product of
Firm 1, the customer enjoys utility V x P1. If the customer buys the closed-source product of Firm 2, the
customer enjoys utility level V

(1 x) P2 .

Either firm has the option of open-sourcing its software product. We note that the closed-source product
provides additional value through the use of proprietary features such as specialized tools, clip art, etc.
Since these enhancements are available only to purchasers of the commercial product, the open-source
1121

product lacks these proprietary features. As such, the open-source product provides customers with less
value than the commercial product. We denote this reduction in value by 3. In addition, we recognize that
users of both products (commercial and open-source) gain additional value from the availability of the
source-code of the open-source product. It must be noted that the commercial and the open-source
products share the similar code-base. Hence, the availability of the source code allows all users to inspect
the source code and identify bug fixes or develop enhancements that are available to all users. We denote
this increase in value by 1. Accordingly, we assume that the value of the commercial product to a customer
is V+ 1. Letting 2= 3 1, the value of the OSS product becomes V 2. We assume that Σφάλμα! Note
that the term 1+ 2 represents the difference in value associated with purchasing the commercial product
over its open-source counterpart. We view the open-sourced product as more customizable than the
closed-source product. Since the OSS product is more easily customizable than the closed-source product,
we assume that a customer’s fit cost for the open-source product is
where 0
1. It follows that a
customer located at distance x in product space from the first firm enjoys utility levels UC1=(V+ 1) x P1,
and UC2=(V+ 1) (1 x) P2 if the customer buys the closed-source product from Firm 1 and Firm 2,
respectively. If the customer chooses the open-source alternative of either firm, the customer nets utility
level UO1=(V 2)
x, or UO2=(V 2)
(1 x). Implicit in our definition of open-sourcing is that the OSS
products are offered free of charge by the two firms. We take as given in our model, without loss of
generality, that customers have the ability to costlessly install and use the open-source products.
Before analyzing the possible outcomes in market configurations involving open-sourced products, we note
that our analysis focuses only on those situations where all customers in the market are served prior to the
firms’ decision to open-source. The parameters of our model can be chosen so that the two firms are each
local monopolies. In such situations, open sourcing by a firm may result in an increase in the market share
of the commercial product, and indeed open sourcing may result in higher profits. To see this, note that the
two firms in our model are local monopolies prior to choosing their open-sourcing strategy when V< .
Intuitively, the higher the fit cost, the more customers become captive to the firm that is closest to them. If
the fit cost is high relative to values, some customers would forgo purchases altogether, and thus a firm’s
pricing decision has no effect on the other firm’s profit. It is easily shown that a firm’s profit in a local
monopoly configuration is equal to V2/(4 ). Open sourcing in such situations may increase the market
share of a firm’s commercial product. In particular, when (i.e, when the difference between the value of the
open-source and the commercial products is small relative to the reduction of fit cost as a result of opensourcing), the market share of each firm’s commercial product is less than 1/2, so the two firms do not
compete head-to-head with their commercial products. Furthermore, whenever 1+ 2 also satisfies
1+ 2>V ,1 , that is, when the difference in value between the closed- and open-source products of a
firm is large relative to value prior to the release of the open-source version, it can be shown that a firm’s
profit increases as a result of open-sourcing. However, we find these situations strategically less interesting
because in equilibrium the open-sourcing decision of a firm that maintains its local monopoly status does
not affect the profits of its opponent. We thus focus only on those situations in which open-sourcing has
strategic implications. We discuss next the outcomes of the various modes of competition.
4.1

Duopoly with closed-source products

The simplest case in our environment is that of two firms competing with closed-source products. The
profit-maximizing price be equal to P10=P20= . Intuitively, as customers incur a higher fit cost they become
more captive, and thus the firms enjoy more market power and could afford to increase their prices. The
equilibrium profits of the two firms are Σφάλμα!, consistent with the notion that more market power,
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indicated by higher customer fit costs, translates into higher profits for the two firms. Having established
our benchmark, we turn next to an analysis of competition in which one of the firms also offers an opensource product.
4.2

Duopoly with only one firm offering an open-source product

Suppose Firm 1 decides to offer, free of charge, an open-source version of its commercial software product.
The introduction of the open-source product has two main effects. First, some of Firm 1’s customers would
find it more profitable to choose the free open-source product. This effect works so as to reduce the profit
of Firm 1. The second effect entails making Firm 2 compete with the free open-source product of Firm 1.
This essentially works so as to dampen the effect on Firm 1’s profits of changes in the price charged by Firm
2, and also as a way for Firm 1 to “steal” some of Firm 2’s customers. It is important to note that the
customer who is indifferent between acquiring the product of either firm is contemplating a choice
between the free open-source product of Firm 1 and the commercial closed-source product of Firm 2.
Analyzing competition in the presence of an open-source product is somewhat complicated because,
depending on the model parameters, three configurations are possible involving varying measures of
customers who acquire some of the three products. We depict the most general situation in Figure 2
below.

Figure 2. Market for software products in duopoly where Firm 1 has open-sourced.
The customer located at x11 is indifferent between the OSS product and the commercial product offered by
Firm 1. The customer located at at y11 is indifferent between the OSS product (Firm 1’s) and the
commercial product offered by Firm 2.
Interior Solution
In this setting, all customers to the left of xI,11 purchase Firm 1’s closed-source commercial product, while
all customers located to the right of yI,11 purchase Firm 2’s commercial product. The customers located
between xI,11 and yI,11 find it optimal to use Firm 1’s OSS product. It follows that a fraction xI,11 of the
customers purchase Firm 1’s commercial product and that a fraction 1 yI,11 of the customers purchase
Firm 2’s commercial product. The remaining fraction yI,11 xI,11of customers chooses Firm 1’s OSS product.
Solving for the two prices yields Σφάλμα! and Σφάλμα!. In equilibrium, these prices give rise to values of
xI,11 and yI,11 that can be expressed as: Σφάλμα! and Σφάλμα!
In equilibrium the profits of the two firms are

Σφάλμα! and Σφάλμα!

We need to ensure that, according to our assumption, the parameters of our model are chosen so that
0<xI,11<yI,11<1. It is readily verified that, given our choice of parameters, xI,11>0 and yI,11<1. To ensure
sure that xI,11<yI,11, we require that:
Σφάλμα!

(1)

When condition 1 is satisfied, we term the segment of customers who choose the free OSS version
“customer loss.”
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No Customer Loss (y11 11)
If condition 1 is not satisfied, all customers prefer Firm 1’s commercial product to its free OSS version
available. Intuitively, (1) is more likely to be violated if 1 or 2 – or both 1and 2– are relatively high,
implying that the inherent value of the additional features offered in the commercial version is sufficiently
higher than in the free OSS version. Firm 1’s commercial product still benefits from the release of the opensource product (perhaps through a better management of code errors). Let superscript II denote this
region. Straightforward calculations yield equilibrium prices chosen by the two firms that can be expressed
as Σφάλμα! and Σφάλμα!. The equilibrium profits of the two firms can be written as:
Σφάλμα!

(2)

Σφάλμα!

(3)

and

Firm 2 is driven out of the market (x11 1)
We use superscript III to indicate the parameter region where x11 1. It can be easily checked that when the
following condition holds, Firm 2 can no longer compete and Firm 1 becomes a monopoly:

1 3

(4)

To maximize its profit Firm 1 chooses price PIII,11= 1

and has profit III,11= 1

.

Having exhausted the set of possible outcomes when one of the firms opens up its source code, we turn to
an analysis of competition when both firms offer an open-source product.
4.3

Duopoly with open-source products

When both firms decide to open their products, there are four products in the market. The most general
market situation is depicted in Figure 3 below in which non-zero measures of customers choose to
purchase one of the four products.

Figure 3. Market for software products in duopoly where both firms have open-sourced
In Figure 3, the customer at x12 is indifferent between the OSS product and the commercial product
offered by Firm 1, while the customer located at distance y12 from Firm 1 is indifferent between the two
OSS products. In addition, the customer located at x22 is indifferent between Firm 2’s OSS product and the
commercial product of Firm 2.
Interior Solution
As above, we start with an analysis of the situation in which non-zero measures of customers choose each
of the four products. Let superscript I denote the corresponding parameter region. In this setting, all
customers who are located on the left of xI,12 purchase Firm 1’s closed-source commercial product and all
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customers located on the right of xI,22 purchase Firm 2’s commercial product. The customers who are
located between xI,22 and xI,12 use either Firm 1’s or Firm 2’s free OSS product. Two firms’ profits:
PI,12=PI,22=( 1+ 2)/2. (5)
Hence, the equilibrium profits of the two firms can be written as:
Σφάλμα!

(6)

Note that since the assumed solution entails non-zero measures of customers that use any of the four
products, we need xI,12<yI,12<xI,22. Since the firms are symmetric, this translates into a single condition
involving the two ’s. It can be checked that if the following condition is to be satisfied in order for the
parameters to yield such a solution:
1<(1

)

2. (7)

No Customer Loss (x22=x12)
In this case, the two firms compete head-to-head with their closed-source commercial products. As above,
we maintain the assumption that the release of the open-source product increases the value that
customers derive from using the commercial version of a product, even though no customer could gain
utility from using an open-source product. It turns out that, with or without this assumption, the
equilibrium has the same properties as the equilibrium that we analyzed in the benchmark case above (so
that xII,22 is equal to 1/2 and the profits of the two firms are equal, II,12= II,22= /2).
Having established the outcome of competition in all possible situations in our model, we turn next to an
analysis of the incentives that firms may have to open-source their products.

5

OPEN-SOURCING EQUILIBRIUM

We first describe the sequential-move game between our two firms. The game proceeds as follows: In the
first stage, the firms independently and simultaneously choose whether or not to release open-source
versions. In the second stage, upon observing their opponent’s open-sourcing decision, the firms,
independently and simultaneously, choose their prices to maximize profit. Our equilibrium concept is
subgame perfection (see Selten, 1975). A strategy profile for each of the two players is a subgame perfect
equilibrium if it is an equilibrium in any of the subgames of the original game. We find the subgame perfect
equilibria of our game using backward induction. We start with the second stage of the game. Depending
on the firms’ actions in the first stage, there are four possible open-sourcing configurations. Only three of
which are distinct, due to symmetry. The optimal pricing decisions and payoffs in each of these second
stage configurations are discussed in Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν
βρέθηκε.. The three main cases of Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.
provide the necessary payoff values for the first stage problem. Thus, we can evaluate the first-stage
equilibrium outcomes using the payoffs we deduced in Section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της
αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.. The profit of each of the two firms when no firm releases an open-source version
we denote by neither. The profit of each of the two firms when both firms release open-source versions is
denoted by both. In the asymmetric case when one of the firms releases an open-source version, we
denote by self the profit of the firm that released the open-source version and by rival the profit of its
opponent. Table 1 summarizes the payoffs that correspond to the first-stage actions of the two firms.
The equilibrium outcome can be found by inspecting the firms’ payoffs. The outcome of competition
depends on the choice of the model’s parameters since we have multiple solutions derived in sections
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Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε. and Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο προέλευσης της
αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.. Thus, a different payoff structure may exist for different regions of the parameter
space. There are four different symmetric payoff matrices to be considered.
Firm Payoffs (Firm 1,Firm 2)
Firm 2
Closed
Open
,
,
neither neither
rival self

Closed
Firm 1
Open

,
self rival

,
both both

Table 1. Payoff Matrix Structure.
Relevant in the computation of equilibria is the ranking of the firms’ payoffs in different competitive
regimes. By choosing different values of the parameters of our model, the ranking of the profits that
correspond to the first-stage actions of the two firms changes. Different equilibria obtain that correspond
to the different ranking of the firms’ payoffs. We explore the parameter space in terms of the value of 1,
the incremental gain in the value of the commercial product brought about by the release of its opensource version, relative to the other parameters of the model. We find that the profits that result from the
two firms’ first-stage open-sourcing decisions can be ranked differently depending how the value of 1
compares to the other parameters of the model.
We start by assuming that 2 and satisfy 2< . We turn to discuss next the ordering of the payoffs in the
various parameter regions. The ordering of the payoffs is summarized in Table 2. We also relegate the
definition of the cutoffs that define each region to an appendix that is available from the authors upon
request.

Region

Order of Payoffs
for Different Regions
A

Region

B

Region

C

Region

D

neither

rival

neither
neither
self

both

self

both

rival

both

self

rival

both

rival

=

=

=

self

neither

=

Table 2. Order of Payoffs.
Given these parameter regions and the ordering of the firms’ payoffs in each region, we can finalize our
equilibrium analysis. Figure 4 summarizes the equilibria in each of the regions of the parameter space that
correspond to Table 2. We note that multiple equilibria co-exist in some of the regions of the parameter
space. In region A, since neither self and rival both, the firms’ dominant first-stage action is not to
release an open-source version. Regardless of its opponent’s action, each firm is better off with a closedsource product. Therefore, in this case (the benchmark discussed in section Σφάλμα! Το αρχείο
προέλευσης της αναφοράς δεν βρέθηκε.), in the unique equilibrium the two firms do not release opensource versions.
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Figure 4. The equilibria with respect to

1

when

2

.

The equilibria that correspond to parameters that fall in region B also contain outcomes in which the two
firms do not release open-source versions. No firm would consider a release of an open-source version if its
opponent were not to release an open-source version (since in this region neither self). However, not
releasing an open-source version is no longer the best action irrespective of the opponent’s open-sourcing
decision. Given that the other firm has an open-source product, the best response would be to release an
open-source product as well, rival both. Thus, opening the source code can also be part of the
equilibrium. However, both firms are better off in the equilibrium that does not involve the opening of
source code.
As above, in region C, there are two equilibria in which the firms either release or do not release opensource versions. Unlike the situation that arises when the model’s parameters fall within region B, in region
C the firms’ payoffs in both equilibria are the same (so the equilibrium that involves releasing an opensource version is no longer payoff dominated).
Inspection of the payoffs in Table 2 indicates that, when the model’s parameters are in region D, a firm
could profitably and unilaterally open up its code. In this region, self neither and both rival. Thus,
irrespective of the action of its opponent, a firm’s best first-stage action is to open yo its code. Thus, the
unique equilibrium has both firms releasing open-source versions.
It can be easily seen by inspecting the values of the cutoffs that as the value of 2 increases relative to ,
the two regions A and B decrease in size. When 2 the regions I and II vanish. In that case, both firms
open their source code in the unique equilibrium for all values of 1.

6

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we analyzed the conditions under which firms find it optimal to release open-source versions
of their products. Conventional wisdom suggests that open-sourcing increases the size of the market. In
turn, greater exposure allows firms to reap higher profits through either increased sales of complementary
products (e.g., hardware) or through reduced future costs of maintaining and managing the software code.
This explanation is incomplete and somewhat fallacious, as clearly greater profit increases could be
achieved through limited releases of the source code or through free distribution of the closed-source
product. Recent research has considered the incentives for open-sourcing in connection with a
complementary services market. While in today’s business environment the software and services markets
are hard to disentangle, we gain some insight by focusing only on the software product market. The main
driving force of our model is the impact of open-sourcing on the customers’ values. Open-source versions
tend to provide less functionality than their commercial versions. However, customers could find the open
source product more valuable than it closed source counterpart as a result of the better customization
opportunities. In our model, the “crimped” product competes head-to-head with the products of the
competing firm. As a result, the release of an open-source version better insulates a firm from the pricing
strategy of its opponent. All things equal, this implies that the firm that releases the open-source version
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has a competitive edge over its opponent. Clearly, the firm that unilaterally releases the open-source
version increases its profit, provided that it can maintain its customer base. If there is customer loss (i.e.,
when the release of the open-source version causes some of the releasing firm’s customers to migrate to
the free, open version) the outcome is influenced by the trade-off between higher prices and a smaller
customer base. We have shown how these trade-offs affect the firms’ decision to release open-source
products. We identified parameter regions in which the equilibrium has the firms releasing open-source
products. An important managerial implication is that open-sourcing is likely to occur when the difference
in customer valuation between the proprietary and the open-source products is high relative to the fit cost.
It is comforting to note that in most examples in which open-sourcing arises in a competitive environment,
there is a sizable gap between the product valuations of the open- and closed-source products by
customers. Not all firms in today’s software business environment have included open-sourcing in their
strategic repertoire. Another implication of our analysis shows that in order to stay competitive, software
firms should consider a strategy to open-source their products in case a competitor chooses to do so.
The market for software products and services is under continuous evolution. Our model suggests that
open- and closed-source software products are bound to co-exist. However, co-existence of the two types
of products is more likely when the open-source product lacks significant features, or when the closedsource version becomes more valuable as a result of better code maintenance (like ridding the code of
bugs). Also important is the ease with which customers could customize the open-source product. More
facile customization of the open-source product implies that, all other things equal, an equilibrium is more
likely to arise in which competitive firms release open-source versions of their software products.
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